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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-eight-year-old Jacob Torrez pleaded guilty
to one count of aggravated DUI. The district court sentenced Mr. Torrez to a unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. The district court then ordered Mr. Torrez
to pay a total of $82,837.61 in restitution. On appeal, Mr. Torrez asserts that the district
court abused its discretion when it awarded $79,518.55 in restitution to Ada County
Indigent Services.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
After responding to reports of a disturbance involving two male subjects at the
Kuna Skate Park, an officer encountered Mr. Torrez and his friend Andrew Capcha
walking around a white pickup truck parked on the side of Swan Falls Road.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,

PSI), pp.3-4.)

Mr. Torrez and

Mr. Capcha both had slurred speech and glassy, bloodshot eyes, and the officer told
both of them not to drive and that he would call them a taxi. (PSI, p.3.) The officer
waited nearby for the taxi, but when he returned to where the truck had been parked,
the truck and the men were gone. (PSI, p.3.)
Soon afterwards, a witness reported that a white pickup truck had been involved
in a hit and run in Kuna. (PSI, p.3.) Officers pursued the truck before its driver lost
control and the truck hit a tree and rolled multiple times. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Torrez, who
owned the truck, was driving. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Torrez was ejected from the truck and
sustained serious, life-threatening injuries.

(PSI, p.3.)

The hospital emergency

department report stated that Mr. Torrez had apparently been wedged between the
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truck and a fence, and that it took at least 20 minutes to extract him. (PSI, p.52.) He
suffered multiple lacerations, spinal fractures, multiple rib fractures, splenic laceration,
and operative left wrist and left ankle injuries. (PSI, p.54.) Ultimately, Mr. Torrez faced
over $175,000 in medical bills for his injuries.

(Tr., p.9, L15-17.)

The passenger,

Mr. Capcha, also sustained serious injuries. (PSI, p.3.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Torrez later pleaded guilty by way of an Alford
plea 1 to one count of felony aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, in
violation of Idaho Code § 18-8006.

(R., pp.34-42, 93-96.)

The plea agreement

contemplated that Mr. Torrez would agree to "pay restitution on all charges." (R., pp.94,
96.) The district court accepted Mr. Torrez's Alford plea. (R., p.94.) At the sentencing
hearing, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years
fixed. (R, pp.1 04-07.) The State also informed the district court that it would seek at
least $82,837.61 in restitution, and asked the district court to leave the question of
restitution open. (R, p.104.) The district court left the question of restitution open and
set a date for review. (R, p.104.)
At the restitution review hearing, the State requested a total amount of
$82,837.61 in restitution.

(Tr., p.5, Ls.13-14.)

Mr. Torrez challenged the amount of

restitution to be awarded to Ada County Indigent Services (Indigent Services), asserting
that Indigent Services was not a "victim" under the criminal restitution statute, I.C. § 195304.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.10-25.) Mr. Torrez also asserted that he should not pay the full

amount of restitution requested for Indigent Services, because Mr. Capcha was partially
responsible for his injuries and the amount of medical expenses attributable to

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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Mr. Torrez would have been reduced in a civil suit by Mr. Capcha's contributory or
comparative negligence. (Tr., p.13, L.6 - p.15, L.9.) Mr. Torrez's counsel asserted:
[T]he restitution that's being sought by [Indigent Services] is to cover
[Mr. Capcha's] injuries that were incurred in this accident. And it's just
kind of a situation, I think, if this was brought before a civil jury and there
were issues of contributory negligence in the case, I think a jury would
have a hard time finding that [Mr. Capcha] was not responsible for what
has occurred in this case because of his involvement here.
This wasn't just something that the individuals were out drinking
and it was a question of whether or not someone was in a position where
they would be safe to drive and [Mr. Capcha] made an error in judgment.
There's a report that [Mr. Capcha] was specifically advised by a police
officer, when they made contact with Mr. Torrez or [Mr. Capcha], not to
drive a vehicle because neither one of them was in a position where they
could safely operate a motor vehicle.
And so we know that [Mr. Capcha] was aware of this. He entered
into the vehicle. He suffered injuries because of that. And the question is
whether or not he was comparatively responsible for the injuries that he
suffered. And I think, in this particular case, Judge, that certainly the
answer would be yes.
(Tr., p.13, L.7 - p.14, L.8.)
Mr. Torrez's counsel stated that a civil suit would have included the following
argument: "[Mr. Capcha], how can you blame Mr. Torrez for the injuries when you were
part and parcel to this? It was almost like you're two peas in a pod here. And now
you're saying, hey, it's not my fault; it's Mr. Torrez's fault." (Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.1.)
According to Mr. Torrez's counsel, that was
why restitution in this case is inappropriate. That when you talk about the
comparative negligence of [Mr. Capcha] and you apply that in this case,
that it would be inappropriate and undesirable to require that someone
else pay his medical damages for what he really was a part of and made
decisions that resulted in his own injuries.
(Tr., p.15, Ls.3-9.)
The State argued that Mr. Capcha was a victim under I.C. § 19-5304, because
Indigent Services filed a lien against him to recover the amount it paid for medical
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treatment on his behalf.

(Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.13.) The State also argued that

Indigent Services was a victim under I.C. § 19-5304.

(Tr., p.16, L.4 - p.17, L.19.)

However, the State did not expressly argue against applying comparative negligence.
(SeeTr., p.15, L.21-p.18, L.21.)

The district court decided not to apply comparative negligence to the restitution
order, because if Mr. Torrez's case "were to have been tried to a civil jury, the jury also
would have been presented evidence to support a claim for less tangible losses
suffered by [Mr. Capcha], such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life and
those sorts of less tangible types of damages .... " (Tr., p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.9l Thus,
the district court stated, "I'm not going to speculate any further about what a civil jury
might or might [not] have done in this case." (Tr., p.21, Ls.12-14.) The district court
then determined that Indigent Services was a victim under I.C. § 19-5304. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.9-14.)

Additionally, the district court found that Mr. Capcha was a victim under

I.C. § 19-5304. (Tr., p.23, Ls.5-17.)
The district court ordered restitution in the amount requested, for a total
restitution of $82,837.61. (R, pp.115-16, Tr., p.25, Ls.1-6.). The district court ordered
restitution in the following amounts:
CAPCHA ANDREW PAUL
FARRIS HElD & DUNCAN
OREGON MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP
DR COLLEEN ZIMMERMAN
ST ALPHONSUS MEDICAL GROUP
ADA COUNTY INDIGENT SERVICES
IDAHO STATE CRIME LAB-DUI

TOTAL:

$56.00
$200.00
$2,473.06
$490.00
$0.00
$79,518.55
$100.00
$82,837.61

2 "Economic loss" recoverable in criminal restitution proceedings "does not include less
tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress."
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a).
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(R., pp.115-16.) The district court also stated that Mr. Torrez's plea agreement, which
"waived the right to appeal ... would not affect the defendant's ability to - in my view, to
appeal from this judgment." (Tr., p.26, Ls.8-14.)
Mr. Torrez filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order of
Restitution. (R., pp.117-18.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded $79,518.55 in restitution to
Ada County Indigent Services?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Awarded $79,518.55 In Restitution To
Ada County Indigent Services

A.

Introduction
Mr. Torrez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded

$79,518.55 in restitution to Ada County Indigent Services, because the district court did
not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. The district court decided not to
apply comparative negligence to the restitution order, because it would not "speculate"
as to what a civil jury would have done in this case.

(Tr., p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.14.)

However, the applicable legal standards from I.C. § 19-5304, the criminal restitution
statute, require a district court in criminal restitution proceedings involving a criminally
negligence defendant to determine whether and to what extent the economic loss
reflected in the restitution award arose from the victim's own negligence as opposed to
the defendant's crime. In this case, if Mr. Torrez were criminally negligent, the statute
would have required the district court to reduce the award to Indigent Services by an
amount corresponding to the extent Mr. Capcha's injuries arose from his contributory
negligence. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by not determining whether
Mr. Torrez was criminally negligent, and, if so, applying comparative negligence to the
restitution order.

7

B.

The Applicable Legal Standards In I.C. § 19-3504 Require A District Court To
Apply Comparative Negligence In Criminal Restitution Proceedings Involving
Criminally Negligent Defendants
Mr. Torrez asserts that the applicable legal standards in I.C. § 19-3504, Idaho's

criminal restitution statute, require a district court to apply comparative negligence in
criminal restitution proceedings involving criminally negligent defendants.
Whether comparative negligence must be applied when determining a criminally
negligent defendant's obligation to pay restitution under I.C. § 19-5304 appears to be a
question of first impression in Idaho.

The Idaho Constitution guarantees to crime

victims the right "[t]o restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing the
offense that caused the victim's loss."

Idaho Const. art. I, § 22(7).

"The decision

whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of a trial court,
guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the policy
favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss." State v. Smith,
144 Idaho 687, 692 (Ct. App. 2007). "The determination of the amount of restitution is a
question of fact for the trial court whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence."

Id.

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Vargas,
152 Idaho 240, 243 (Ct. App. 2012).
Appellate courts "will not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of
discretion is shown." Smith, 144 Idaho at 692. Review of a district court's discretionary
decision involves a multi-tiered inquiry to determine (1) whether the lower court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
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the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. Id.
In determining the amount of restitution to be ordered, a district court "shall
consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense,
the financial resources, needs and earning ability of the defendant, and such other
factors as the court deems appropriate." I.C. § 19-5304(7). Economic loss is based on
the preponderance of evidence submitted to the district court by the prosecutor,
defendant, victim, or presentence investigator. I.C. § 19-5304(6). Restitution may only
be ordered "for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers." I.C. § 19-5304(2).
The definitions of "victim" include:
(i) The directly injured victim which means a person or entity, who suffers
economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct

and shall also include the immediate family of a minor and the immediate
family of the actual victim in homicide cases;

(iv) A person or entity who suffers economic loss because such person or
entity has made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim
pursuant to a contract including, but not limited to, an insurance contract,
or payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim to payor settle a
claim or claims against such person or entity in tort or pursuant to statute
and arising from the crime.
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i), (iv) (emphases added). The definition of "economic loss" from
the statute "includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses,
such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct, but does not include less
tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or economic distress."
I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) (emphasis added).

"Therefore, in order for restitution to be

appropriate, there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which the
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defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150
Idaho 599, 602 (2011).
Idaho's comparative or contributory negligence statute 3 provides that:
Contributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence or
comparative responsibility was not as great as the negligence, gross
negligence or comparative responsibility of the person against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the
proportion to the amount of negligence or comparative responsibility
attributable to the person recovering. Nothing contained herein shall
create any new legal theory, cause of action, or legal defense.
I.C. § 6-801.

According to the Idaho Supreme Court, "[c]ontributory negligence is not a
defense in a criminal case."

State v. Taylor, 67 Idaho 313, 316 (1947).

However,

Taylor should not bar the application of comparative negligence in criminal restitution
proceedings, because a criminal restitution proceeding is distinct from the underlying
criminal case.

For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held "that an order for

restitution is separate and apart from a criminal sentence." State v. Straub, 153 Idaho
882, 886 (2013); see also State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806 (2004) (stating that,
because an order of restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the victim may
execute as provided by the law of civil judgments, "the order of restitution provided in
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) becomes, in essence, a civil judgment for the amount of
such restitution").
Also, contributory negligence generally cannot be used as a defense to
intentional conduct.

See Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 309

10

(1991). However, under Idaho law, U[i}n every crime or public offense there must exist a
union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." I.C. § 18-114. The
Idaho Supreme Court has "defined 'criminal negligence' as used in I.C. § 18-114 to
mean gross negligence." State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 408 (1990). Thus, I.C. § 18114 should not bar the application of comparative negligence in criminal restitution
proceedings involving a criminally negligent defendant.
Mr. Torrez asserts that the language in § 19-5304 limiting restitution awards to
economic loss caused by the defendant's criminal conduct requires a district court to
determine whether a defendant was criminally negligent, and, if so, whether and to what
extent the victim's contributory negligence would reduce the amount of restitution
awarded. Because "there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which
the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim," Corbus, 150 Idaho at
602, I.C. § 19-5304 implicitly requires a district court to apply comparative negligence in
criminal restitution proceedings involving a criminally negligent defendant, and to reduce
the amount of restitution awarded to the extent the directly injured victim's negligence
was the cause of his or her injuries.
The California Court of Appeal recently reached a similar conclusion by
interpreting California's criminal restitution statute so as to require
a criminally negligent defendant to reimburse a victim only to the extent
his or criminal conduct caused the victim economic losses, thereby
implicitly allowing the application of the doctrine of comparative negligence
to preclude restitution to the extent the victim's own negligence was a
cause of his or her injuries. A criminal defendant is required to reimburse
his or her victim only from those economic losses suffered "as the result of
the criminal defendant's conduct."
If the doctrine of comparative
negligence were not applicable, a criminally negligent defendant could be
Technically, Idaho's comparative negligence statute provides that a party's
contributory negligence is not an absolute bar to recovery. See Harrison v. Taylor, 115
Idaho 588, 591 (1989).
3
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required to reimburse a victim for economic losses that
comparatively the result or the fault of the victim's own negligence.

were

People v. Millard, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 751, 778 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).4
Mr. Torrez submits that this Court should adopt the Millard Court's reasoning with
respect to applying comparative negligence in Idaho criminal restitution proceedings.
As discussed above, an Idaho district court may only order that restitution be awarded
to a victim.

I.C. § 19-5304(2).

The criminal restitution statute's definition of victim

includes "[a] person or entity who suffers economic loss because such person or entity
has made ... payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim to payor settle a
claim or claim against such person or entity in tort or pursuant to statute and arising

from the crime." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(iv) (emphasis added). Further, a "directly injured
victim" is "a person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the

defendant's criminal conduct . ... " I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added).

The

statute's definition of economic loss includes "direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses,
such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct . . . . "

I.C. § 19-

5304( 1)(a) (emphasis added).
The above provisions show that I.C. § 19-5304 is akin to the California criminal
restitution statute, which similarly requires restitution for economic losses suffered "as
the result of the criminal defendant's conduct." See Millard, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 778
(internal quotation marks omitted).

These provisions in Idaho's criminal restitution

4 But see State v. Knoll, 614 N.W.2d 20, 24-25 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that a
defendant may not raise the contributory negligence of a victim as a defense to criminal
restitution in Wisconsin). In Knoll, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that
forbidding contributory negligence as a defense to criminal restitution was consistent
with the mandatory nature and goals of restitution, and that bringing the issue of
contributory negligence into criminal restitution proceedings would be inconsistent with
the informal nature of the proceedings. Id.
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statute indicate that a district court, in a criminal restitution proceeding involving a
criminally negligent defendant, may not award restitution for medical expenses or other
economic loss caused by the victim's own fault or negligence. Thus, a district court
should apply comparative negligence when determining the amount of restitution to
award in criminal restitution proceedings involving a criminally negligent defendant.
Applying comparative negligence would reduce an award of restitution to the extent the
directly injured victim's own negligence was the cause of his or her injuries.
In criminal restitution proceedings involving a criminally negligent defendant,
permitting a district court to award restitution for economic loss caused by the directly
injured victim's negligence would make the language in § 19-5304 limiting restitution
awards to economic loss caused by the defendant's criminal conduct surplusage. "A
fundamental principle of statutory construction is that a provision should not be
construed to make surplusage of provisions included within the act." Potlach Corp. v.
United States, 134 Idaho 912, 915 (2000). Courts "must give effect to all the words and

provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant." State v.
Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866 (2011) (quoting Farberv. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho

307,310(2009)).
Under I.C. § 19-5304, restitution may only be awarded for economic loss
resulting from the defendant's criminal conduct.

I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) and (2).

In a

criminal restitution proceeding involving a criminally negligent defendant, if a district
court were to award restitution to a I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(iv) entity for economic loss
caused by a directly injured victim's negligence, then it would render the language
limiting restitution awards to economic loss caused by the defendant's criminal conduct

13

superfluous. Permitting such awards by district courts would thereby make that limiting
language surplusage, in violation of a fundamental principle of statutory construction.
In sum, I.C. § 19-5304 requires a district court to apply comparative negligence in
criminal restitution proceedings involving a criminally negligent defendant.

Applying

comparative negligence would reduce the amount of restitution awarded to the extent
the directly injured victim's negligence was the cause of his or her injuries.

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards
Because It Did Not Determine Whether Mr. Torrez Was Criminally Negligent And
Whether To Apply Comparative Negligence
Mr. Torrez asserts that the district court in this case did not act consistently with

the applicable legal standards from I.C. § 19-5304, because it did not determine
whether Mr. Torrez was criminally negligent and whether to apply comparative
negligence.

Under the applicable legal standards, if Mr. Torrez were criminally

negligent, the district court should have applied comparative negligence to determine
whether and to what extent the economic loss reflected in the restitution award to
Indigent Services arose from Mr. Capcha's own negligence as opposed to Mr. Torrez's
crime.

Because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal

standards, it abused its discretion when it awarded Indigent Services $79,518.55
in restitution.
The facts of this case are sufficient to raise the issue of Mr. Capcha's
contributory negligence. See Hodge v. Borden, 91 Idaho 125, 136 (1966) (deciding, in
a civil automobile accident case where the guest passengers had been drinking with the
driver and remained with the driver even after he stopped the vehicle, that the
underlying facts "were sufficient to raise the issue of contributory negligence"). Here,
Mr. Torrez and Mr. Capcha both had slurred speech and glassy, bloodshot eyes when
14

the officer approached them, the officer told both of them not to drive and that he would
call them a taxi, and Mr. Capcha got into the truck when Mr. Torrez drove off. (PSI,
p.3.)

The truck belonged to Mr. Torrez.

(PSI, p.4.)

Those facts indicate that

Mr. Capcha, as a guest passenger in Mr. Torrez's truck, "did not act as a reasonably
prudent person would have acted under the circumstances." See Hodge, 91 Idaho at
135-36.
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Capcha is a "directly injured victim" under § 195304(1)(e)(i) and Indigent Services is a "victim" under § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv), the district
court in this case did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to awarding
restitution. Indigent Services is a victim only to the extent it suffered economic loss by
making payments "on behalf of a directly injured victim," i.e., Mr. Capcha, to pay for
claims "arising from the crime." I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv). If Mr. Torrez were criminally
negligent, the limiting language in I.C. § 19-5304 would preclude an award of restitution
for any payments Indigent Services made on behalf of Mr. Capcha for economic loss
arising from Mr. Capcha's own negligence.

Mr. Torrez does not argue that

Mr. Capcha's contributory negligence would excuse Mr. Torrez from all liability, but only
that it would reduce the restitution awarded to Indigent Services. However, the district
court decided not to apply comparative negligence, and therefore did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards.
The district court here decided not to apply comparative negligence after linking
comparative negligence with "less tangible types of damages," because evidence of
both would have been presented had this case been before a civil jury. (Tr., p.20, L.18
- p.21, L.14.) The district court stated, "I'm not going to speculate any further about
what a civil jury might or might not have done in this case."
15

(Tr., p.21, Ls.10-14.)

However, I.C. § 19-5304 specifically excludes "less tangible damage such as pain and
suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress" from an award of criminal restitution.
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a), (2). In contrast, the language of the criminal restitution statute
implicitly requires the application of comparative negligence in cases involving criminal
negligent defendants to reduce the amount of restitution awarded to the extent the
directly injured victim's negligence was the cause of his or her injuries. See I.C. § 195304(1)(a), (e)(i), (e)(iv). By not applying comparative negligence for the above reason,
the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards, and thus it
abused its discretion when it awarded Indigent Services $79,518.55 in restitution.
As discussed above, the facts of this case are sufficient to raise the issue of
Mr. Capcha's contributory negligence.

See Hodge, 91 Idaho at 136.

However, the

district court in this case did not determine whether Mr. Capcha had been negligent.
Nor did the district court expressly determine whether Mr. Torrez had been criminally
negligent,5 or whether he acted intentionally. "In every crime or public offense there
must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
I.C. § 18-114. Aggravated QUI does not require a showing that the defendant was
negligent when the injuries to the victim occurred. See State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892
(1995).
Thus, under the applicable legal standards from I.C. § 19-5304, the district court
should have first determined whether Mr. Torrez was criminally negligent when he
committed the crime of aggravated QUI.

If Mr. Torrez had acted intentionally, then

5 In Millard, the defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence while
committing an act forbidden by law and causing bodily injury to another person. Millard,
95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762; see Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(a). The trial court noted that the
offense was a "negligence[-]type crime." Millard, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776.
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comparative negligence would not be applicable.

See Burgess, 119 Idaho at 309.

However, if Mr.Torrez had been criminally negligent, then the district court would have
to apply comparative negligence to determine whether and to what extent Mr. Capcha's
economic loss was caused by his own negligence.

If Mr. Capcha's own negligence

contributed to his injuries, then the district court would have to reduce the award to
Indigent Services by an amount corresponding to the extent Mr. Capcha's injuries arose
from his contributory negligence. The restitution award should be vacated and the case
remanded for such a determination by the district court.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Torrez respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the restitution award and remand his case with instructions to apply comparative
negligence and, if the district court determines that Mr. Torrez was criminally negligent
and that Mr. Capcha's own negligence contributed to his injuries, reduce the restitution
award to Indigent Services by an amount corresponding to the extent Mr. Capcha's
injuries arose from his contributory negligence.
DATED this 6th day of June, 2013.

~/(~~
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY'
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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